kryptos-pii

A fine-tuned LAYA classifier that decides, in context, whether a span of text is personal information. It is the detector behind Kryptos PII Protection. The code that proposes spans for it and reads its scores is in Kryptos-Calfus/Kryptos-PII.

It answers one question per candidate span:

Is the value of 'span' personal information about a specific individual in this text (name, contact detail, ID number, account, password, or birth date)?

What it is not

It is not a span finder. It never reads raw text looking for PII. Something upstream proposes candidate spans and this model rules on each one. On its own it will find nothing.

That split is deliberate. Proposal is a recall problem a regex solves well and cheaply; deciding whether Grace is a person or a word is a context problem a regex cannot solve at all. kryptos_pii.candidates is the proposer this model was trained against.

It is not a classifier of PII type. It answers yes or no. The category in a Kryptos finding (email, payment_card, …) comes from a deterministic read of the matched text, not from this model.

Use it

pip install kryptos-pii-local
kryptos-pii-model download

from kryptos_pii_local import redact

redact("Call Priya on 9812345678").text   # 'Call [PERSON_NAME] on [PHONE]'

That wires up the proposer, this model, the category pass and the masking. To drive the checkpoint directly:

import laya
from kryptos_pii.candidates import QUESTION, state_for, set_context_chars

set_context_chars(120)                      # what it was trained with
agent = laya.load("path/to/laya-pii")
text = "Call Priya on 9812345678"
scores = agent.predict_batch([state_for(text, 5, 10)], QUESTION)
scores[0]["answers"]["pii"]["noul"]         # P(personal information)

Training

The context window is not a tuning knob. The model was trained to see 120 characters on each side, and changing it at inference invalidates the reported F1 until you re-measure.

Stored in bfloat16 because that is the precision it computes in (amp_dtype: bf16); fp32 storage carried precision that every forward pass discarded. Converting changed no detection on the held-out set.

Measured behaviour

On a 111-case held-out set, end to end through the Kryptos pipeline, matching a prediction to a true span by character overlap:

This is a different and harsher number than the 0.988 above: that one scores the model's own yes/no decisions on proposed pieces, this one scores the whole system against real spans and is what a user actually experiences.

Limits

Read these before trusting it with anything that matters.

• English only. It has not been evaluated on any other language.
• Recall is not 1.0. It misses things. An unlabelled 10.2.3.4 scores 0.003. Run finetune/evaluate.py against your own data before choosing a threshold; do not take 0.5 on faith for your domain.
• The misses are its own. On the 111-case held-out set every one of the 9 missed values was proposed as a candidate and scored below threshold here: three IPv4 addresses, two spelled-out dates, an Indian mobile number, a Tamil name, a postcode and a street address. Raising recall means retraining or moving the threshold, not improving the proposer. It also cannot see what the proposer never offers, but on this set that was not the limiting factor.
• Values whose shape is proof should not reach it. API keys, Luhn-valid card numbers and labelled fields (Aadhaar: …, password: …) are matched deterministically in Kryptos and never put to a neural vote. A live credential must not depend on a probability.
• Synthetic training data. It was fine-tuned on generated examples. Names, formats and contexts outside that distribution are where it will be weakest, and non-Western names deserve your own evaluation rather than this one.
• It is a detector, not a guarantee. Masking output from an imperfect detector is risk reduction, not compliance.

Licence

Apache-2.0. The base model carries its own licence from Answer.AI.