BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4BA bilingual Hebrew and English security analyst that runs entirely on your own machine. Your security data never leaves it.
About the name.
bx-cyber-nogahis this model's name under the BrainboxAI naming convention:bxfor the lab,cyberfor the domain, andnogah(Hebrew for the planet Venus, the morning star) for the middle size tier. The repository id staysBrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4Band will not change. Every existing link and script keeps working.
About version stability. Retraining on the same task is pushed to the same repository and updates the weights in place. Someone who downloads today and again in two months may get different weights under the same name. If you need absolute stability, pin yourself to a specific commit rather than to the main branch.
A language model trained on security material that answers in both Hebrew and English. It was built to reason in the order a SOC analyst reasons: identify the vulnerability, rate its severity, map it to MITRE ATT&CK, propose detection logic, and write a report a customer can read.
It is built on Google's unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it.
What "runs on your machine" means here. The quantised file is about 5.3 GB and runs on a single consumer GPU. You can run it on a fully air-gapped network. No finding, no report and no customer name leaves the machine.
Security data is among the most sensitive material a company holds. Sending an internal finding, a vulnerability analysis or a customer incident report to a cloud model is usually a breach of policy or of contract.
This model is the alternative: small enough to run locally, fluent in Hebrew and English, and deployable inside a closed network.
It does not replace an analyst. It is a force multiplier for a SOC team, a pentest consultancy, or a researcher who wants help without handing over the material.
ollama pull hf.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B:Q4_K_M
ollama run hf.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B:Q4_K_M
A warning about the
Modelfilein this repository. That file is left over from the build step, and the chat template inside it is not Gemma-4's. Do not build a model from it withollama create. Use theollama pullabove, which constructs the correct template from the GGUF file itself.
The file inside the repository is named gemma-4-E4B-it.Q4_K_M.gguf. The name is left over from the build step. It is the fine-tuned model, not the base model.
./llama-cli -m gemma-4-E4B-it.Q4_K_M.gguf \
-p "Analyze CVE-2024-3400. What is the attack vector and mitigation?" \
--temp 0.2 --top-p 0.9 -n 1024
Reporting in Hebrew is one of the things this model was trained for, so here is the Hebrew case:
# Prompt: "Write a short incident summary in Hebrew for a customer: an attacker
# used PowerShell to download and run a remote payload."
./llama-cli -m gemma-4-E4B-it.Q4_K_M.gguf \
-p "כתוב סיכום אירוע קצר בעברית ללקוח: תוקף השתמש ב-PowerShell כדי להוריד ולהריץ payload מרוחק." \
--temp 0.2 --top-p 0.9 -n 1024
The prose comes back in Hebrew. Technical terms (CVE, ATT&CK, CVSS, PowerShell) stay in English, which is how Israeli security teams actually write.
The repository
BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensorsis currently private, so the code below will not run without access. The open route to running this model is Ollama or llama.cpp, above. For access to the full weights, use the contact address at the foot of this card.
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors")
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
"BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors",
torch_dtype="auto",
device_map="auto",
)
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "You are a senior SOC analyst. Respond with clear, actionable security guidance."},
{"role": "user", "content": "Map this behavior to MITRE ATT&CK: attacker used PowerShell to download and execute a remote payload."},
]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, return_tensors="pt", add_generation_prompt=True)
outputs = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=1024, temperature=0.2, top_p=0.9)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))
| Parameter | Value | Why |
|---|---|---|
temperature |
0.2 | Low creativity. Security work wants facts |
top_p |
0.9 | Standard nucleus sampling |
max_new_tokens |
1024 | Enough for a detailed analysis with a detection rule |
repetition_penalty |
1.05 | Stops the model looping on a CVE citation |
A model this size produces much more reliable analyses when it is forced through five steps instead of answering freely. Given an open question it tends to fabricate CVE details, miss a sub-technique, or skip the detection logic entirely.
Security work has no tolerance for an invented fact. A wrong CVSS score or a MITRE technique that does not exist sends an entire investigation to the wrong place.
The five steps: threat identification, severity assessment, ATT&CK mapping, detection logic, and caveats with sources to verify against.
And this is an impression, not a measurement. No numerical comparison was run between the model with this prompt and without it.
DEFINITIONS:
success: A complete 5-step security analysis with no fabricated CVEs, no invented CVSS scores, no made-up MITRE techniques. Every claim is either verifiable in a public source or explicitly marked as needing verification.
scope: in-scope - CVE triage, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, detection rule drafting (Sigma/YARA/Snort), incident report generation (Hebrew/English), vulnerability severity assessment, security hardening guidance. out-of-scope - active exploitation guidance, malware development, evasion of authorized security controls, attribution claims about specific threat actors without evidence.
verifiable claim: A factual statement that can be confirmed against NVD, MITRE ATT&CK, vendor advisories, or peer-reviewed security research. Anything else is opinion or speculation and must be marked as such.
hallucination risk: This model was trained on public CVE data with a cutoff. CVEs published after training, vendor-specific advisories, and zero-day intelligence are NOT in scope and must trigger an "unknown - verify externally" response.
PREMISES:
- The user is a security professional (SOC analyst, pentester, security engineer, IR responder) or a developer asking about a vulnerability.
- The model was trained on 1.16M examples covering 280K CVEs, MITRE ATT&CK, detection engineering, and bilingual security reporting.
- The model is 4B parameters - capable but not frontier. Wrong answers in security can cost real money or breach data.
- "I do not know" is always an acceptable answer. Fabrication is never acceptable.
- The user can speak Hebrew or English. Match the language of the question.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. Every analysis must follow the 5-step structure: Threat ID, Severity, ATT&CK, Detection, Caveats. No exceptions.
2. CVE IDs must be in the format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN. Never invent a CVE ID. If unsure, write "CVE not in training data - verify in NVD."
3. CVSS scores must include the full vector string (e.g., CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) or be marked as "score unverified - calculate from NVD."
4. MITRE ATT&CK techniques must use the official ID format (T#### or T####.###). Never invent techniques.
5. Detection rules (Sigma/YARA/Snort) must be syntactically valid. If the user asks for a rule the model is unsure how to write correctly, return a rule skeleton with comments marking unknown fields.
6. Every analysis must end with a "Verify against:" line listing the authoritative sources the user should check (NVD link, MITRE page, vendor advisory, etc.).
7. Forbidden: speculation about threat actor attribution unless the user explicitly provides evidence (IOCs, TTPs, etc.). Default to "attribution unknown."
8. Forbidden: providing working exploit code. Conceptual explanation of attack mechanics is allowed for defensive purposes; functional PoC is not.
9. Hebrew responses must use technical terms in English where the Hebrew translation is ambiguous (e.g., "Privilege Escalation" not "העלאת הרשאות" alone).
10. If the question is non-security (general programming, business, etc.), reply: "אני מודל לניתוח סייבר. השאלה הזו אינה בתחומי" / "I am a cybersecurity analysis model. This question is outside my scope."
EDGE_CASES:
- User asks about a CVE published after training cutoff -> "CVE-XXXX-XXXXX is not in my training corpus. Please retrieve current details from https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-XXXX-XXXXX before relying on any analysis."
- User asks for working exploit code -> "I provide defensive analysis only. For authorized red-team work, refer to Metasploit, ExploitDB, or a licensed penetration testing engagement."
- User describes behavior that maps to multiple ATT&CK techniques -> List all relevant techniques with confidence levels (high/medium/low) and rationale for each.
- User asks about a zero-day or unpublished vulnerability -> "Zero-day intelligence is out of scope for this model. Coordinate with your CERT, ISAC, or vendor PSIRT."
- Ambiguous behavioral description -> Ask clarifying questions before mapping to ATT&CK. Do not guess.
- User asks for detection logic on a tool the model does not know -> Provide the logic in pseudo-code with a note: "Adapt to your SIEM query language (Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Sentinel KQL, etc.)."
- User asks "is this safe?" about a tool/library -> Refuse to give a binary answer. Explain known issues, last audit date if known, and recommend an SCA scan.
- Hebrew question about an English-only concept -> Respond in Hebrew but keep the technical term in English (e.g., "MITRE ATT&CK" stays in English).
OUTPUT_FORMAT:
format: Structured markdown with the 5 numbered sections
structure: |
## 1. Threat Identification
[CVE ID / CWE / behavior pattern. If unknown, say so explicitly.]
## 2. Severity Assessment
[CVSS vector + score, or "unverified - calculate from NVD"]
[Brief rationale: what makes this critical/high/medium/low]
## 3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
[Technique ID(s) with confidence: e.g., T1059.001 (high) - PowerShell execution]
[Sub-technique rationale, max 2 sentences each]
## 4. Detection Logic
[Sigma/YARA/Snort rule, or query pseudo-code adaptable to user's SIEM]
[If unsure, provide skeleton with TODO markers]
## 5. Caveats and Verification
- [What the user must verify externally]
- [Known limitations of this analysis]
- Verify against: [list of authoritative sources with URLs]
language: Match user input language (Hebrew or English). Technical terms (CVE, ATT&CK, CVSS) stay in English.
length: 300-700 words depending on complexity
VERIFICATION:
- Are all 5 sections present and labeled?
- Are all CVE IDs in valid format (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)?
- Are all ATT&CK technique IDs valid (T#### or T####.###)?
- Is the CVSS vector complete (or explicitly marked as unverified)?
- Does the detection rule have valid syntax (or skeleton with TODO)?
- Is there a "Verify against:" section with at least one external source?
- regression check: No 5-step structure should be skipped, even for "simple" questions.
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors")
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
"BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors",
torch_dtype="auto",
device_map="auto",
)
# Paste the full prompt from the code block above.
SYSTEM_PROMPT = """[paste the full prompt from the code block above]"""
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": SYSTEM_PROMPT},
{"role": "user", "content": "Analyze CVE-2024-3400. Map to ATT&CK and propose detection."},
]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, return_tensors="pt", add_generation_prompt=True)
outputs = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=1024, temperature=0.2, top_p=0.9)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))
OUTPUT_FORMAT with your schema.EDGE_CASES.OUTPUT_FORMAT.| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Base model | unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it |
| Architecture | Gemma4ForConditionalGeneration |
| Context length | 131,072 tokens |
| Method | QLoRA. The base model is loaded in 4 bits during training |
| Framework | Unsloth |
| Primary corpus | 1,157,765 examples |
| Correction set | 107,600 further examples |
| Total | 1,265,365 examples |
| Language mix | Roughly 45% Hebrew, roughly 55% English |
| Hyperparameters, hardware, wall time and cost | Not recorded |
A note on sources. No independent training record survived for this model. Everything in the table above comes from the model's own previous card. There is no log file, no run report, and no second source to check it against. Rows that were not on that card are left empty rather than filled with a guess.
A note on "1.16M" against "1.27M". Both figures have appeared on cards in this family, and both are correct. 1.16 million is the primary corpus alone. 1.27 million is the primary corpus plus the correction set. The exact numbers are in the table above.
| Source | Examples | Language | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| BrainboxAI CVE Corpus v2 | 994,713 | Hebrew and English | 280K CVEs across 8 task types |
Fenrir v2.0 (AlicanKiraz0/Fenrir) |
83,918 | English | Causal reasoning on cyber threats |
| Trendyol Cybersecurity | 53,199 | English | 200+ security domains |
| MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping | 14,936 | English | Activity to ATT&CK technique |
HackerOne Disclosed Reports (hackaprompt/hackerone-reports) |
9,353 | English | Bug bounty reports with CWE mapping |
MITRE ATT&CK Reasoning (cobo512/mitre-attck-reasoning) |
1,646 | English | Chain-of-thought on ATT&CK |
| Total | 1,157,765 |
Three of the sources above,
AlicanKiraz0/Fenrir,cobo512/mitre-attck-reasoningandhackaprompt/hackerone-reports, are no longer reachable on Hugging Face as of writing. The names stay here as provenance, not as links. The links to them on the previous card were broken and have been removed.
BrainboxAI's own datasets (
brainboxai_cyber_trainandbrainboxai_cyber_delta) are not public. They appear in this repository's metadata to record provenance, not as a link you can open.
After evaluating the first version, three weaknesses were found, and a further 107,600 examples were trained on to fix them:
T1059.003 and T1053.005. Fixed with explicit disambiguation examples.The correction reduced the first problem. It did not remove it. See the Limitations section.
No scored public benchmark was run on this model. There is no score, and no number you can compare against another model.
What was done instead: an internal evaluation across 30 security tasks. CVE detail accuracy (lookup and explanation), ATT&CK technique and sub-technique mapping, Sigma and YARA drafting, severity assessment, and Hebrew incident-report writing.
How to read that, honestly. There is no results file, no per-task score, and no way to reproduce it from outside. It is enough to say the model was checked. It is not a benchmark.
What that means for you: there is no measured evidence that this model is better than its base model at anything. There is work that was done and an impression formed. Those are two different things.
unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it. Every limit of that model is still here.| Repository | What is inside | Who wants it |
|---|---|---|
BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B |
gemma-4-E4B-it.Q4_K_M.gguf (5.3 GB) and this card |
Ollama, llama.cpp, LM Studio |
BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors |
Merged 16-bit weights (16.0 GB). Private repository | transformers and continued training, on request |
BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-verifier-pilot |
A follow-on experiment: a model that verifies findings | Anyone who wants to see where this goes next |
The repository also holds gemma-4-E4B-it.BF16-mmproj.gguf (0.99 GB). That is Gemma-4's vision component, needed only if you want to feed it images, such as a screenshot of a finding. Text analysis does not need it.
Apache 2.0. Free for commercial and non-commercial use, with attribution.
This is a fine-tune of unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it, so the terms of that model apply to this one as well. The base model is published under Apache 2.0 and also points to the Gemma 4 licence terms.
Ethical use: this model is for defensive security work and authorised research. Use in unauthorised offensive operations is prohibited by the licence and by law.
@misc{elyasi2026cyberanalyst,
title = {Cyber-Analyst 4B (bx-cyber-nogah): A Bilingual On-Device Security Model for SOC and Pentest Workflows},
author = {Elyasi, Netanel},
year = {2026},
publisher = {BrainboxAI},
howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B}},
note = {Fine-tuned from unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it on 1,157,765 security examples plus a 107,600-example correction set}
}
Built by Netanel Elyasi, founder of BrainboxAI, an Israeli applied-AI studio building small, private, domain-specialised models.
For in-house deployment, tuning on internal material, or a question about fit: netanele@brainboxai.io.
Part of the BrainboxAI family of on-device models. See also law-il-E2B (law) and code-il-E4B (code).
unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it